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What You Know About and Don't Deal With
Can Cost You:

A School District's Potential Liability for
Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment
Davis v. Monroe County Board ofEducation'
I. INTRODUCTION

The first national study of sexual harassment in public schools indicated
that eighty-five percent of girls and seventy-six percent of boys in grades eight
through eleven have experienced sexual harassment; seventy-nine percent of
those reporting sexual harassment said that other students were the perpetrators.'
With so many students being harassed, it is no wonder that some of them have
turned to teachers, principals, and parents to remedy the problem. However,
what should a child and her parent do when a principal responds by asking,
"Why is [your daughter] the only one complaining?, 3 or when a teacher says,
"Boys will be boys."? In situations where parents have found the schools'
solutions, or lack thereof, wanting, they have turned to the legal system to
protect their children. Federal district and circuit courts, however, have had
difficulty setting standards for when and if a school district is liable for studenton-student sexual harassment. At least one court has held that school districts
can never be liable, while others have held that a school district can be liable for
failing to respond to harassment of which it has knowledge.'

1. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
2. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION,
HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA'S

SCHOOLS 7, 11 (1993).
3. The school principal involved in this case asked LaShonda Davis's mother this
question. Davis, 526 U.S. at 635.
4. Compare Davis v. Monroe County Bd. ofEduc., 120 F.3d 1390 (1lth Cir. 1997)
(case below) and Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir.
1996) (holding that private damages action for student-on-student harassment is available
under Title IX only where funding recipient responds to these claims differently based
on gender of victim), cert. denied,519 U.S. 861 (1996) and Doe v. University of Ill. 138
F.3d 653, 668 (7th Cir. 1998) (decision upholding private damages action under Title IX
for funding recipient's inadequate response to known student-on-student harassment
vacated and remanded for consideration in light of Davis), cert. granted,526 U.S. 1142
(1999), with Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 960-61

(4th Cir. 1997) (same), vacated and districtcourt decision aff'd en banc, 169 F.3d 820
(4th Cir. 1999), cert.grantedsub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S.Ct. 11 (1999),
cert. dismissed in part, 120 S.Ct. 1578 (2000) (not addressing merits of Title IX hostile

environment sexual harassment claim and directing district court to wait until the
Supreme Court's resolution of Davis's Title IX claim against the Monroe County Board
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, the Supreme Court
addressed the circuit split, discussed the ramifications of holding a school district
liable for student-on-student sexual harassment, and formulated a standard to
guide the imposition of such liability.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
While in fifth grade at Hubbard Elementary School, LaShonda Davis was
the victim of a prolonged pattern of sexual harassment by one of her male
classmates, G.F.5 The harassment began in December 1992, when G.F.
attempted to touch LaShonda's breasts and genital area and made statements
such as "I want to get in bed with you" and "I want to feel your boobs."' On two
occasions in January 1993, similar conduct occurred, with LaShonda reporting
each incident to her mother, Aurelia Davis, and her classroom teacher, Diane
Fort LaShonda's mother also contacted Fort, who assured her that the school
principal, Bill Querry, had been informed of the incidents.8
G.F.'s conduct continued for many months. One incident in February 1993
involved G.F. placing a doorstop in his pants and acting in a sexually suggestive
manner toward LaShonda during physical education class.9 LaShonda reported
G.F.'s behavior to her physical education teacher, Whit Maples. ° Later that
February, LaShonda complained to another classroom teacher, Joyce Pippen, of
more harassing behavior that had occurred during Pippen's supervision."
LaShonda's mother contacted Pippen to notify her of the problem. 2 In March13
1993, LaShonda reported more harassment by G.F. to both Maples and Pippen.
In mid-April 1993, G.F. rubbed his body against LaShonda in the school hallway
in what LaShonda considered a sexually suggestive manner, and LaShonda

of Education), and Oona R.S. v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 478 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting
qualified immunity claim and concluding that Title IX duty to respond to student-onstudent harassment was clearly established by 1992-1993), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2039
(1999). District courts that have held school districts liable under Title IX include: Doe
v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 74 (D.N.H. 1997); Nicole M. v. Martinez
Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Wright v. Mason City
Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1419-1420 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Bruneau v.
South Kortright Central Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 173 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Bosley v.
Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1023 (W.D. Mo. 1995).

5. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633-35.
6. Id. at 633.
7. Id. at 634.
8. Id.

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/4
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again reported the behavior to Fort. 14 The incidents ultimately ended in May
1993, when G.F. was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, sexual battery.'
The school district took no disciplinary action against G.F. for his behavior
toward LaShonda even though LaShonda's mother had reported the behavior to
Fort, Maples, Pippen, and Querry.16 Querry's response to LaShonda's mother's
inquiry as to what action the school would take against G.F. was, "I guess I'll
have to threaten him a little bit harder."' 7
In May 1994, LaShonda's mother filed suit on LaShonda's behalf in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The Monroe
County Board of Education (hereinafter "Board"), Charles Dumas, the school
district's superintendent, and Querry were named as defendants.'" The
complaint alleged that the defendants had violated Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972' 9 in that the Board was a recipient of federal funding, and
the defendants had created an intimidating, hostile, offensive, and abusive school
environment through their deliberate indifference to GF's unwelcome sexual
advances toward LaShonda.21 The district court granted the defendants' motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 2' The
court dismissed the claims against the individual defendants on the basis that
only federally funded educational institutions are proper defendants in private
causes of action under Title X.22 The court dismissed the claim against the
Board because there was no allegation that the Board, or any employee of the
Board, had assumed any role in the harassment; therefore, any harm to

14. Id.
15. Id. Other girls in the class were also victims of G.F.'s behavior. At one point,

a group of female students, including LaShonda, approached a teacher to request to speak
with Querry about G.F.'s conduct. Id. at 635. The teacher allegedly denied the request
with the statement, "If [Querry] wants you, he'll call you." Id. As a result of the string
of incidents from December 1992 to May 1993, LaShonda's previously high grades fell
and, in April 1993, her father discovered that she had written a suicide note. Id.
LaShonda also told her mother that she "didn't know how much longer she could keep
[G.F.] off her." Id. at 634.
16. Id. at 635.
17. Id. Querry asked LaShonda's mother why LaShonda "was the only one
complaining." Id.
18. Id. at 635-36.
19. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
20. Davis, 526 U.S. at 636. The complaint sought compensatory and punitive
damages, attorney's fees, and injunctive relief. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ.,
120 F.3d 1390, 1392 (11th Cir. 1997). The original complaint also stated a violation of
LaShonda's due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), and that the school had
discriminated against LaShonda on the basis of race under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). Id.

These claims were dismissed, and Davis did not ask for them to be reheard en banc in the
Eleventh Circuit. Id.
21. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363, 368 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
22. Id. at 367.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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LaShonda was not proximately caused by a federally funded educational
provider.'
. Aurelia Davis appealed the district court's dismissal of the Title IX claim
against the Board, and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed.2 4
The court borrowed from Title VII case law and determined that student-onstudent sexual harassment gives rise to a cause of action under Title IX:
[W]e conclude that as Title VII encompasses a claim for damages due
to a sexually hostile working environment created by co-workers and
tolerated by the employer, Title IX encompasses a claim for damages
due to a sexually hostile educational environment created by a fellow
student or students when the supervising authorities knowingly fail to
act to eliminate the harassment.'
Upon the Board's motion, the Eleventh Circuit granted a rehearing en banc and
affirmed the district court's dismissal of Davis's Title IX claim against the
Board.26 The Eleventh Circuit determined that since Title IX was enacted
pursuant to Congress's Spending Clause power,27 Title IX must provide
recipients of federal educational funding with "unambiguous notice of the
conditions they are assuming when they accept" the funding.28 The court
determined that while Title IX provides recipients with notice that they must
stop their employees from acting in a discriminatory manner, it does not provide
notice of any duty to prevent student-on-student sexual harassment.29
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the use of Title VII and cases
interpreting Title VII to determine the liability of schools for student-on-student
sexual harassment. °

23. Id.
24. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1195 (1lth Cir. 1996).
25. Id. at 1193.
26. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1406 (11 th Cir. 1997).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
28. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1399.

29. Id. at 1401. Four judges wrote in dissent, stating that the statute, by not
identifying any particular perpetrator of discrimination, includes the misconduct of third
parties. Id. at 1412. The dissenters also reasoned that the plain language of the statute
provides recipients with sufficient notice that a failure to respond to student-on-student
harassment could trigger liability for the district. Id. at 1414. Title IX states:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
30. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1399-1400 n.13. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the use of

Title VII jurisprudence as a means of determining liability because "Title VII and Title
IX are worded differently. Title VII was enacted under the far-reaching Commerce
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/4
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 3' to resolve the circuit
split regarding whether, and under what circumstances, a recipient of federal
educational funds can be held liable in a private damages action arising from
student-on-student sexual harassment.32 The Court held that a private damages
action under Title IX may be brought against a funding recipient where (1) the
funding recipient had actual knowledge of sexual harassment of a student; (2)
the funding recipient was deliberately indifferent to the sexual harassment; (3)
the harassment was perpetrated by another student under the funding recipient's
control; and (4) the harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive that it can be said to have deprived the victim of access to the
educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.33

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The common law requires schools to maintain discipline and prevent harm
among students. Section 320 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts applies to
teachers and other persons in charge of public schools 34 and states in part:
One . . . who voluntarily takes the custody of another under
circumstances such as... to subject him to association with persons
likely to harm him, is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to
control the conduct of third persons as to prevent them from
intentionally harming the other or so conducting themselves as to
create an unreasonable risk of harm to him, if the actor (a) knows or
has reason to know that he has the ability to control the conduct of the
third persons, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and
opportunity for exercising such control.35
Congress passed Title IX in 1972 to prohibit educational institutions
receiving federal funds from engaging in discrimination on the basis of sex in
educational programs and activities. 36 Title IX is similar to earlier civil rights

Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Title IX was not.. ." and Title VII
liability depends on agency principles which are inapplicable in discussing liability for
student-on-student sexual harassment because students are not agents of the school board.
Id.
31. 524 U.S. 980 (1998).
32. See supra note 4.
33. Davis, 526 U.S. at 642-53.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 cmt. a (1965).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 (1965).
36. Title IX states:

No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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statutes, specifically Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits
race discrimination by institutions receiving federal funding," and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits sex discrimination by employers
against employees.38 Because neither of the earlier statutes specifically applied
to sex discrimination in schools, Congress enacted Title IX to bridge the gap
between them; moreover, Title IX was to have a "far-reaching" impact."
Although Title IX does not explicitly mention sexual harassment, comments
made by proponents of the legislation support an expansive reading of Title IX.4
In Cannon v. University ofChicago,4' the Supreme Court held that Title IX
is enforceable through an implied right of action despite the lack of statutory
language to that effect. 42 Building on Cannon, the Supreme Court held in
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools43 that damages are an available
remedy for a school district's violation of Title IX,' and that a teacher's sexual
harassment of a student is intentional discrimination under Title IX for which a

school district can be held liable.45 The Court stated that it was "adher[ing] to

the general rule that all appropriate relief is available in an action brought to
vindicate a federal right when Congress has given no indication of its purpose
with respect to remedies." The Court rejected the argument that because Title
IX was passed pursuant to Congress's Spending Clause power the plaintiffs
should be limited to equitable and injunctive relief.47 The Gwinnett County
School District argued that the presumption that only equitable and injunctive
remedies are available for unintentional Title IX violations should also apply to
intentional Title IX violations.48 However, the Court stated that "[t]he point of
assistance....
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1994) ("No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.").
38. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
39. 118 CONG. REC. 5808 (1972) (statement by Sen. Bayh, sponsor of Title IX).
40. See 117 CONG. REc. 39,526 (1971) (debate between Reps. Green and Steiger);
118 CONG. REc. 5806-07 (1972) (statements of Sen. Bayh, sponsor of Title IX).
41. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
42. Id. at 677-78.
43. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
44. Id. at 76.
45. Id. at 75.
46. Id. at 68.
47. Id. at 74-76. The Court also stated that it would not decide whether Title IX
had been enacted under Congress's Spending Clause power, Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or both. Id. at 75 n.8.
48. Id. at 74. The Court had previously observed that remedies under Spending
Clause statutes are limited when the alleged violation was unintentional. See Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1981).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/4
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not permitting monetary damages for an unintentional violation is that the
receiving entity of federal funds lacks notice that it will be liable for a monetary
award. This notice problem does not arise in a case... [where] intentional
'
discrimination is alleged."49

Although the FranklinCourt determined that Title IX provided a cause of
action for damages incurred by a student sexually harassed by a teacher, the
Court did not enunciate a standard by which a school district's liability should
be assessed." Furthermore, the Court did not address the legal issues arising in
the context of student-on-student sexual harassment. 51 Left to their own devices,
the lower courts devised varying standards, with differing results.
5 2held
The Fifth Circuit, in Rowinsky v. BryanIndependentSchool District,
that a school district cannot be held liable for student-on-student sexual
harassment under Title IX unless a "plaintiff [can] demonstrate that the school
district responded to sexual harassment claims differently based on sex."" a The
Rowinsky court also decided that a funding recipient can only be held liable for
the discriminatory acts that it and its agents perpetrated; 54 therefore, a school
district cannot be held liable for the discriminatory acts perpetrated by students
because students are not agents of the school.55
In Doe v. University offllinois,56 the Seventh Circuit held that a public high
school may be held liable for student-on-student sexual harassment under Title
IX. 57 The court stated that there was no need for a plaintiff to "plead or prove
that the recipient, or any of its officials, failed to respond as a result of sexually
discriminatory intent."" Rather,
[t]he failure promptly to take appropriate steps in response to known
sexual harassment is itself intentional discrimination on the basis of
sex, and so, once a plaintiff has alleged such failure, she has alleged
the sort of intentional discrimination against which Title IX protects. 9
The Doe court discussed the Rowinsky ruling, stating that the Fifth Circuit
had "fundamentally misunderst[ood]" the issue in student-on-student sexual

49. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992).
50. See generally id. at 60-76.
51. Id.
52. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 861 (1996).
53. Id. at 1016.
54. Id. at 1012.
55. Id. at 1010 n.9.
56. 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998). Jane Doe attended University High School in
Urbana, Illinois; the University of Illinois oversees administration of the high school,
which is why Doe sued the University. Id. at 655.
57. Id. at 661-62.
58. Id. at 661.
59. Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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harassment cases. 6° The Doe court emphasized that plaintiffs in these cases are
requesting that school districts be held liable for their failure to respond to
known sexual harassment, not for the actions of a harassing student.6
Discussing the relationship between Title VII and Title IX, 62 the Doe court
stated that "there is no reason why students such as Jane Doe should be afforded
a lesser degree of protection against such 'hostile environment' discrimination
than adult workers in the employment setting regulated by Title VII." 63
Furthermore, the court acknowledged that the definition of sexual harassment64
and issues regarding it in the educational context come from Title VII cases.
The court affirmed its decision in Smith v. Metropolitan School DistrictPerry

Township,65 in which it held that because of differences in the language and
history of Titles IX and VII, "cases decided under the latter should not be
construed to impose Title IX liability upon schools for the acts of their
employees on the basis of agency principles."' Nevertheless, the court allowed
the plaintiff to recover and found that "[t]he absence of an agency relationship
holding that the liability Jane Doe seeks is direct,
is simply irrelevant, given our
67
rather than agency-based.
In Brzonkala v. VirginiaPolytechnicInstitute,68 the Fourth Circuit held that
a public university may be held liable under Title IX for a hostile environment
caused by a student-on-student sexual assault.69 The court borrowed liberally
from Title VII jurisprudence," stating, "in determining whether an educational
institution's handling of a known sexually hostile environment is actionable
'discrimination' under Title IX, we must look to the extensive jurisprudence
developed in the Title VII context."' The court emphasized that under Title VII,
"a defendant employer is held responsible ... for the employer's own actions,
its inadequate and tardy response [to the harassment], not the actions of fellow

60. Id. at 662.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 665-67.
63. Id. at 665.
64. Id.
65. 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997).
138 F.3d 653, 665-66 (7th Cir. 1998).
66. Doe v. University of Ill.,
67. Id. at 667.
68. 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997) (dealing with constitutionality of the Violence
Against Women Act), rehearingen banc granted,opinion vacated(4th Cir. 1998), cert.
granted sub nom. U.S. v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999), cert. dismissed in part, 120 S.
Ct. 1578 (2000).
69. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 961.
70. Id. at 957- 61.

71. Id. at 957.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/4
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employees." The court also compared the similarity of standards between Title
VII and Title IX.73

In 1998, in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,74 the
Supreme Court took a major step toward formulating a standard by which a
school district can be held liable for student-on-student sexual harassment. The
Court, addressing a circuit split regarding how to assess a school district's
liability for teacher-on-student sexual harassment under Title IX, 75 defined the
contours of a school district's liability for teacher-on-student sexual
harassment.76

72. Id. at 958.
73. Id. Title VII provides:
[T]o prevail on a 'hostile work environment' sexual harassment claim, an
employee must prove: (1) that he [or she] was harassed 'because of' his [or
her] 'sex'; (2) that the harassment was unwelcome; (3) that the harassment
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive working
environment; and (4) that some basis exists for imputing liability to the
employer.
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996). Similarly, under
Title IX, a plaintiff asserting a hostile environment claim must show:
(1) that she [or he] belongs to a protected group; (2) that she [or he] was
subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based
on sex; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to
alter the conditions of her [or his] education and create an abusive educational
environment; and (5) that some basis for institutional liability has been
established.
Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 467-68 (8th Cir. 1996); Seamons v.
Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 1996) (same); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods.,

Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 540 (1st Cir. 1995) (same), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 959 (1996); Nicole
M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1376 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (same); see
also Oona, R.S. v. McCaffrey, 122 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying Title VII
standards to Title IX hostile environment claim); Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495,
515 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the elements of a "hostile environment claim under Title
VII equally apply under Title IX"); Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57
F.3d 243, 248-51 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); Collier v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp.
1209, 1213-14 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (same); Pinkney v. Robinson, 913 F. Supp. 25,32 (D.D.C.
1996) (same); Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1021-22 (W.D. Mo.
1995) (same); Kadiki v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 892 F. Supp. 746,749-50 (E.D.
Va. 1995) (same); Ward v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 861 F. Supp. 367, 374 (D. Md. 1994)

(same).
74. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
75. Id. at 280; see also Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d
1014 (7th Cir. 1997); Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1997); Doe v.
Claibome County, 103 F.3d 495, 513-15 (6th Cir. 1996); Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch.
Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 469 (8th Cir. 1996).
76. Gebser,524 U.S. at 281. Recall that the Court, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992), declined to establish a standard to guide the
imposition of liability in the teacher-on-student sexual harassment context. See supra
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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The Court rejected the theories of respondeat superior and constructive
notice as ways of determining a school district's liability." The Court
distinguished Title IX from Title VII, where respondeat superior and
constructive notice are used to determine liability, and found that damages
should be predicated on a more narrow standard than the theories of respondeat
superior and constructive notice allow.7' The Court emphasized that the private
action under Title VII had been expressly provided for since the statute's
passage, whereas the private cause of action under Title IX had been judicially
recognized in Cannon.79 Furthermore, the Court found that although damages
were expressly available under Title VII, they had only-been available since
1991 and such damages were capped according to the size of the employer being
held liable.8" Finally, the Court compared the contractual nature ofTitle IX with
the outright prohibition of discrimination in Title VI."1 The Court determined
that the contractual nature of Title IX-that school districts receive federal funds
in exchange for agreeing not to use them in a discriminatory manner-required
the Court to be concerned with "ensuring 'that the receiving entity of federal
funds [has] notice that it will be liable for a monetary award."'8 3 The Court also
studied "Title IX's express means of enforcement-by administrative
agencies-[which] operates on an assumption of actual notice to officials of the
funding recipient.""
The distinctions between Title IX and Title VII led the Gebser Court to
conclude that using the theories of constructive notice and respondeat superior
to determine a school district's liability for teacher-on-student sexual harassment
"would 'frustrate the purposes' of Title IX," and that this result was not what
Congress had intended." The Court found that a school district could only be
held liable for damages under Title IX where the school district had actual

knowledge of the teacher-on-student
harassment and was deliberately indifferent
86
to the harassment.

note 49-50.
77. Gebser,524 U.S. at 285.
78. Id. at 283-88.
79. Id. at 284.
80. Id. at 286.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 292.
83. Id. at 287 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74
(1992)).
84. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 288 (1998).
85. Id. at 285.
86. Id. at 292. In determining who must have actual knowledge of the harassment,

the Court stated that "the knowledge of the wrongdoer himself is not pertinent to the
analysis." Id. at 291.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/4
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IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority

In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,7 the Court considered
"whether a [school] district's failure to respond to student-on-student harassment
in its schools can support a private suit for money damages.""8 In so doing, the
Court applied Gebser's actual knowledge/deliberate indifference standard to
assess the school district's liability under Title IX for student-on-student sexual
harassment.8 9 Furthermore, the Court held that "an action will lie only for
harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it
effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity or benefit.""
The Court based its decision to limit a school district's liability for studenton-student sexual harassment on its previous "treat[ment] [of] Title IX as
legislation enacted pursuant to Congress' authority under the Spending
Clause."9 Because Title IX was enacted pursuant to Congress's Spending
Clause power, "private damages actions are available only where recipients of
federal funding had adequate notice that they could be liable for the conduct at
issue."'92 The Court further stated that the Spending Clause requires that
'Congress speak with a clear voice,' and that '[t]here can, of course, be no
knowing acceptance [of the terms of the putative contract] if a State is unaware
of the conditions [imposed by the legislation] or is unable to ascertain what is
expected of it."' 93 The Court reiterated that "this limitation on private damages
actions is not a bar to liability where a funding recipient intentionally violates
the statute."94
The Court stated that principles of agency law do not apply in actions under
Title IX; a federal funds recipient may be liable in damages only for its own
misconduct.95 The Court further discussed how funding recipients have long had
notice that they may be liable for their failure to respond to the discriminatory
acts of certain non-agents.96
87. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
88. Id. at 639.
89. Id. at 631.
90. Id. at 633.
91. Id. at 640.
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
94. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 642 (1999) (citing
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74 (1992)).

95. Davis, 526 U.S. at 640.
96. Id. at 643. The Court noted that Title IX's regulatory scheme, the Department
of Education's requirements that funding recipients monitor third parties for
discrimination in specified circumstances, and the common law's provision for redress
of a school's failure to protect students from the tortious acts of third parties put schools
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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The Court next interpreted the statutory language of Title IX.97 Title IX
states: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of,or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance. '98 The Court, defining "subject" as "to cause to undergo the action
of something specified; expose," 99 found that for a school district to be held
liable, its "deliberate indifference must, at a minimum, 'cause [students] to
undergo' harassment."" The Court, interpreting the word "under" as "subject
to the guidance and instruction of"..... found that "the harassment must take place
in a context subject to the school district's control."'" The Court believed that
its interpretation of the statutory language limited a recipient's liability to
situations "where the recipient exercises substantial control over both the
t0 3
harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs."
The Court emphasized that in a school setting where there is student-onstudent sexual harassment, a school board exercises significant control over a
° Supporting this proposition, the Court reiterated "the importance of
harasser.'O
school officials' 'comprehensive authority

. .

., consistent with fundamental

105
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.'
The Court next determined that school districts had notice of potential
liability under Title IX for their failure to respond to student-on-student sexual
harassment. The Court pointed out that the National School Boards Association
had issued a publication in March 1993, which observed that school districts
could be liable under Title IX for their failure to respond to student-on-student
sexual harassment." The Court also observed that the Office for Civil Rights
in the Department of Education had recently adopted, although too late to give

on notice of a duty to protect students from third parties. Id. at 643-44.
97. Id. at 644.
98. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
99. Davis, 526 U.S. at 645 (citing RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1415 (1966)).
100. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645 (1999).
101. Id. (citing RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1415
(1966)).
102. Davis, 526 U.S. at 645.

103. Id.
104. Id. at 646.
105. Id. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
507 (1969); New Jersey v. T. L. 0., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.9 (1985)).
106. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 647-48 (1999). See 45
NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION COUNCIL OF SCHOOL ATTORNEYS, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE SCHOOLS: PREVENTING AND DEFENDING AGAINST CLAIMS (rev. ed.

1990)
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the Monroe County School Board notice, policy guidelines noting that studenton-student harassment falls within Title IX's proscriptions."°7
In determining whether conduct rises to the level of actionable harassment,
a court is to look to "a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations,
and relationships,"'08 which includes the ages of the harasser and the victim, the
number of individuals involved, the fact that schools are unlike the adult
workplace, and the fact that children often interact in ways that would be
unacceptable among adults.1°9 The Court stated that, contrary to the dissent's
contention, damages would not be available for insults, teasing, shoving, and
name-calling, even where the comments targeted gender differences.1 0 Thus,
the Court determined that a school district can be held liable only where it is
"deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment . . . [which] is so 'severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive' that it can be said to deprive the victims of
access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.""'
The Court further stated that Title IX's language suggests that the behavior must
be severe enough to have the systemic effect of denying the victim equal access
to an educational program or activity, thus making it unlikely that the failure of
a school to respond to a single instance of student-on-student sexual harassment
will trigger the school's liability."'

107. Davis, 526 U.S. at 647. See DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE OF CIVIL
RIGHTS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL
EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,039-040

(1997).
108. Davis,526 U.S. at 651 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523
U.S. 75, 82 (1998)).
109. Davis, 526 U.S. at 651.

110. Id. at 652. The Court defended the standard it established against the
respondents' argument and the dissent's contention that "nothing short of expulsion of
every student accused of misconduct involving sexual overtones would protect school
systems from liability or damages." Id. at 648 (quoting Respondent's Brief at 16, Davis
v. Monroe County Bd. of Edue., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (No. 97-843)). The Court stated
that only where the funding recipient's response to the harassment is "clearly
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances" will it be deemed "deliberately
indifferent" and thus liable under Title IX. Id. The Court emphasized that "[t]his is not
a mere 'reasonableness' standard." Id. at 649.
111. Id. at 650. The Court stated that "[t]he statute makes clear that, whatever else
it prohibits, students must not be denied access to educational benefits and opportunities
on the basis of gender." Id.
112. Id. at 653. The Court stated that limiting recovery of damages to situations
where the harassment had a systemic effect reconciles the principle that Title IX prohibits
official indifference to known student-on-student sexual harassment with the practical
realities of responding to student behavior, realities that Congress could not have intended
to ignore. Id.
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B. The Dissent
The dissent, authored by Justice Kennedy,"' focused on federalism
concerns, practical matters, and the lack of notice to school districts of their
potential liability. The dissent stated that legislation enacted under the Spending
Clause "is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the
Constitution" and, as a consequence, "Congress can use its Spending Clause
power to pursue objectives outside of 'Article I's enumerated legislative fields'
by attaching conditions to the grant of federal funds." "1 4 The dissdnt concluded
that the Spending Clause power therefore "has the potential to obliterate
distinctions between national and local spheres of interest and power by
permitting the federal government to set policy in the most sensitive areas of
traditional state concern."". 5 Thus, the dissent found that a limit on the federal
government's power depended on the requirement that a state voluntarily and
knowingly accept the terms of the contract it makes when accepting federal
funds, and that in order to so accept, a state must have unambiguous notice of
the conditions under which it accepts the funds." 6 The dissent accused the
majority of "eviscerat[ing] the clear-notice safeguard of our Spending Clause
jurisprudence.. ' . 7
Next, the dissent discussed the difficulty of establishing standards for
deciding when to imply a private cause of action under a federal statute which
is silent on the matter, and the difficulty of defining the scope of damages."
The dissent found these difficulties especially problematic in considering
legislation enacted under the Spending Clause "because [judicial determination
of standards] is in significant tension with the requirement that [such] legislation
give States clear notice of the consequences of their acceptance of federal
funds.". 9 Therefore, the dissent said, the Court "must not imply a private cause
of action for damages unless it can demonstrate that the congressional purpose

113. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas joined Justice
Kennedy's dissent.
114. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654 (1999).
115. Id. at 654-55.
116. Id. at 655.
117. Id. The dissent argued that Title IX's language does not give school districts'
notice that the conduct the majority deemed harassment, and thus gender discrimination,
is within the meaning of the statute; furthermore, the dissent argued, Title IX does not
give any guidance in distinguishing between actionable discrimination and the immature

behavior of children and adolescents. Id. at 672-73. The dissent accused the majority of
imposing liability on school districts for student conduct that is not clearly prohibited by
Title IX and that cannot be identified with any precision by either schools or courts. Id.
118. Id. at 656-57.
119. Id. at 656.
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to create the implied cause of action is so manifest that the 1State...
had clear
20
notice of the terms and conditions of its monetary liability.
The dissent contended that the majority's standard imposed liability on the
States that was unexpected and unknown, with contours that are also
unknowable. 12' The dissent further stated that the limiting principles proposed
by the majority opinion were illusory and the potential costs to schools so great
that it is unlikely Congress could have intended to inflict them. 22
Next, the dissent examined the text of Title IX, stating'that under its most
natural reading, "discrimination violates Title IX only if it is authorized by, or
in accordance with, the actions, activities, or policies of the grant recipient.""
The dissent read the term "under" to mean "pursuant to, in accordance with, or
as authorized or provided by."' 24 The dissent thus argued that it is not enough
for the sexual harassment to occur in an environment subject to the school
district's control, but that it must actually be controlled by the school district."z
In other words, the harassment must be authorized by, pursuant to, or in
accordance with, school policy or actions. 26 The dissent argued that the word
"operations" in the statutory language connotes active and affirmative
27
participation by the grant recipient, not merely inaction or failure to respond.1
Turning to agency principles, the dissent stated that while sexual
harassment of students by teachers is punishable under Title IX, harassment
perpetrated by a student is not. 28 The dissent argued that while the Gebser
Court did not incorporate agency principles of liability that would conflict with
the Spending Clause notice requirement and Title IX's express administrative
enforcement scheme, it did not abandon agency principles altogether.2 2 The
dissent interpreted Gebser as "identify[ing] those employee actions which could
fairly be attributed to the grant recipient by superimposing additional Spending
Clause requirements on traditional agency principles."' 30 The dissent stated that
it could find no basis in law or fact for attributing a student's acts to the school
district."'

120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 657.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 659.

124. Id.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 660.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 661.
Id. The dissent saw the agency relationship between school and teacher as a

necessary, but not sufficient, condition of school liability.
131. Id. The dissent did not appear to address the majority's theory that a school
district's liability is predicated on its failure to respond to harassment among the students,
not on any theory that a student's acts are imputed to the school.
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The dissent further criticized the majority by arguing that the majority did
not explain how to determine what degree of control over a student is sufficient
for a school district to incur liability.'32 Further complicating the issue, argued
the dissent, is that a school's control over its students is more limited than the
majority acknowledged.' 33 The dissent contended that since public schools are
generally required by law to educate all students within a certain geographical
area, including, in some states, students who have been suspended or expelled,
they cannot screen or select students. 34 Moreover, the dissent argued, federal
law imposes constraints on school disciplinary actions. 35 The dissent also
made practical arguments in support of its disagreement with the majority's
reasoning. The dissent noted that schools cannot exercise control over
thousands of students, as they can over a few hundred personnel. 3 1 The dissent
further noted that some schools have to deal with serious problems
of violence
3
and are already overwhelmed with disciplinary problems. 1
Criticizing the majority's failure to distinguish between elementary and
secondary schools and universities, the dissent argued that the majority's holding
applied to them equally, even though universities arguably lack control over
adult students.3 3 Furthermore, the dissent contended that a university's power
to discipline its students for speech that139may constitute sexual harassment is
circumscribed by the First Amendment.
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's reliance on Franklin v.
Gwinnett County PublicSchools'4° and Gebserv. Lago VistaIndependent School
District.'4' The dissent argued that drawing analogies to Title VII hostile
environment harassment jurisprudence in the context of student-on-student
sexual harassment is inapposite because schools are not workplaces and children

132. Id.
133. Id. at 664.
134. Id. at 664-65.
135. Id. at 665. The dissent noted that due process requires that a student facing
suspension be afforded "some kind of notice" and "some kind of hearing." Id. (citing
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975)). The dissent then pointed out that the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1994 & Supp. III

1997), places strict limits on a school's ability to take disciplinary actions against students
with behavior disorder disabilities, even if the disability was not diagnosed prior to the
incident triggering discipline. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 665

(1999).
136. Id. at 666.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 666-67.
139. Id. at 667.
140. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
141. 524 U.S. 274 (1998). Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,
673
(1999).
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are not adults.' The dissent pointed out that acceptable behavior in the adult
workplace does not easily translate into appropriate standards in the school
environment."' The dissent argued that since it is difficult to translate adult
norms into appropriate standards for children, it would be difficult to determine
what constitutes actionable harassment and when equal access to education has
been denied. "
The dissent further criticized the majority's choice of a "clearly
unreasonable" standard in determining the adequacy of a school's response to
sexual harassment.'45 The dissent stated that the standard is essentially a
"reasonableness" standard, "transform[ing] every disciplinary decision into a
jury question."" The dissent then criticized the majority for not specifying
which school official must "know" about the harassment under147 the "actual
knowledge" standard before the harassment becomes actionable.
The dissent further questioned the wisdom of holding a school district liable
' 48
by arguing that "the number of potential lawsuits . . .is staggering.'
Furthermore, the dissent argued, the potential liability of a149school district could
exceed the total federal funding of many school districts.
The dissent concluded its opinion by stating that "[i]n the final analysis, this
case is about federalism." 5 ' The dissent was concerned with the balance
between state and federal power, and with defining the appropriate role of
schools in teaching and supervising children.5
The dissent argued that
decisions regarding a school's role in educating children are best made by
parents, teachers, and administrators at the state and local level. 5 Moreover,
the dissent believed that in the most egregious cases, a student could look to
state law to remedy any harm inflicted by student-on-student sexual
harassment."5 3

142. Davis, 526 U.S. at 675.
143. Id.

144. Id. at 675-76.
145. Id. at 678.
146. Id. at 679.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 680 (citing the 1993 study by the American Association of University
Women Educational Foundation, which found that "fully 4 out of 5 students (81%) report
that they have been the target of some form of sexual harassment during their school
lives").
See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNVERSITY WOMEN EDUCATIONAL
FOUNDATION, supra note 2, at 7.
149. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 680 (1999).

150. Id. at 684.
151. Id. at 685.
152. Id.

153. Id. The dissent pointed out that state tort law and criminal sanctions could
redress a victim's injuries. Id. at 684.
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V. COMMENT

The Davis Court, in an attempt to make everyone happy, satisfied no one.
The school districts still face liability, but the students are not adequately
protected. The actual knowledge standard allows a school district to ignore its
duties to protect children and ensure equality of education. In formulating the
standard to which school districts should be held, the Court brushed aside Title
VII jurisprudence even though the law prohibiting sex discrimination under Title
IX was taken directly from Title VII. The Court ignored Congress's purpose in
enacting Title IX-closing the gap between Titles VI and VII. 54
In formulating its actual knowledge standard, the Court did not discuss
"who" within the school district's administrative hierarchy is to have actual
notice of the harassment before liability is triggered. Furthermore, the Court
ignored the fact that children who are harassed will not understand the
importance of distinguishing between a school official with power to remedy the
harassment by expelling a student, and a teacher who can only move children
around within the classroom, a remedy which will not protect a harassed child
during recess.' 55 School districts can arguably turn a blind eye toward
harassment and claim they never actually knew about the harassment, thus
avoiding liability. A school district may even accuse a child of lying when the
child says she told the teacher or principal. Children without parents willing to
intervene could be left alone in their struggle.
The Court needlessly limited its power to create a standard for liability
when it based the actual knowledge standard for the private damages remedy on
the actual knowledge standard required by the express administrative remedy.
In Gebser, upon which the Davis Court based its entire reasoning, the Court
outlined its powers in fashioning a standard for liability once an action has been
implied.'56 The Gebser Court asserted that it had the power to fashion whatever
standard it deemed necessary,'57 yet restrained itself to an actual knowledge
standard because it determined that Title IX's administrative scheme required
actual notice.'58 The Davis Court blindly followed Gebser's reasoning and
disregarded its Cannon decision, which held that there was a right of action
under Title IX, and its Franklin decision, which held that damages were
available for a school district's violation of Title IX 59 The Court also ignored
154. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
155. The Davis Court implicitly required that the actual notice be given to a school
administrator, as it referred throughout its opinion to "the funding recipient" and school
"administrators." There is no discussion regarding whether a "teacher" is an
"administrator." See generally Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629
(1999).
156. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1998).
157. Id. at 284.
158. Id. at287-91.
159. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 677-78 (1979); Franklin v.
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the fact that the "very purpose of a private right of action for damages is to allow
a remedy in circumstances when the express statutory enforcement scheme
would not."'" Thus, even if a school must have actual knowledge of its
violation of Title IX before its federal funding can be taken away under the
administrative enforcement scheme of Title IX, it does not follow that the Court
must fashion an analogous actual knowledge standard when it assesses liability
in a private cause of action.
Furthermore, the Court's application of the actual knowledge standard in
the student-on-student sexual harassment context blurs the line between the two
different kinds of notice at issue. First, a school must be on notice as to what
Title IX prohibits, and second, a school must have notice that student-on-student
sexual harassment is occurring. Sexual harassment has been accepted as a form
of sex discrimination under Title VII since 1986.161 The plain language of Title
IX prohibits sex discrimination under any school program; therefore, the schools
arguably have been on notice that sexual harassment, including student-onstudent sexual harassment, is prohibited under Title IX 62 Since the schools
have had notice that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination, and sex
discrimination is prohibited by Title IX, the schools have accepted federal
funding with the condition of prohibiting sexual harassment in the school's
activities and programs. Title IX prohibits sex discrimination of all forms in
school activities, and since schools are charged with the control of students, then
the school should be responsible for stopping harassment by one student against
another.
Turning to the second type of notice, it is arguable that the actual
knowledge/deliberate indifference standard is too stringent. Because a school
is charged under the common law with the duty of preventing harm to its
students, 63 it should be aware of any harassment which its students suffer;
therefore, constructive notice should be enough to trigger a school's liability,
whether the harassment is by a teacher or a student. Moreover, the special
vulnerability of children to the harmful effects of student-on-student sexual
harassment requires schools to be on guard for situations that could inhibit a
student's ability to learn. When asked about the effects of student-on-student
sexual harassment, students say they feel embarrassed, self-conscious, confused

Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992).
160. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerisnsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies:
VicariousLiability UnderTitle VII, Section 1983, and Title x, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 755, 780 (1999).
161. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-69 (1986).
162. This is a particularly compelling argument because of Title IX's broad
language, and its focus on the protected class rather than the harasser. See Davis v.
Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1412-14 (1lth Cir. 1997) (noting argument
of the four judges who dissented from the Eleventh Circuit's opinion affirming the district
court's dismissal of LaShonda's claims).
163. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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about their identity, less self-confident, and scared.'" These feelings often lead
to students not wanting to attend school or participate in class discussions; the
end result is poorer academic performance.'"
It is not necessary to import agency theory to hold a school to a constructive
notice standard in the student-on-student sexual harassment context; a school's
common law duty to protect its students from harm triggers the constructive
notice standard. Just as Congress used the common law theory of agency to hold
employers liable for employees' conduct under Title VII, the Court can use a
school district's common law duty to protect children in its charge to hold a
school district liable under Title IX for teachers' and students' sexually
harassing conduct.
Basing its argument on federalism, the dissent contended that education is
a state issue, in which the federal government should not be involved.'" The
dissent, however, failed to recognize that once a local school accepts federal
funding under Title IX, it has allowed the federal government into its sphere.
Also, the state law remedies mentioned by the dissent'67 are arguably
inadequate; they are only available after the sexual harassment has occurred, and
they do nothing to stop the systemic problem of sexual harassment in schools.
A remedy under Title IX, however, would warn schools that they must address
the systemic problem of sexual harassment. With schools addressing the entire
problem among their students, piecemeal redress through state law remedies is
avoided.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sexual harassment among students has become a serious, systemic
problem."' Piecemeal redress through state law remedies will not address the
problem adequately. A school district's common law duty to protect children
is sufficient to hold schools to a constructive notice standard, whether the
harassment is by a teacher or a student. The constructive notice standard is even
more applicable in the school environment than in the adult workplace, where
Title VII's constructive notice standard imposes liability on employers for
employee conduct about which they knew or should have known. While
employers have little control over adult employees with established habits and
mores, schools are charged with the discipline, education, and control of
students. School officials are expected to know what transpires in the school's
hallways, on its playgrounds, and in school buses. School districts need to
164. See AMERICAN AsSOCmiTION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN EDUCATIONAL
FOUNDATION, supra note 2, at 16-17 (1993).
165. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OFUNIVERSITY WOMEN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION,

supranote 2, at 15-16.
166. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 684 (1999).
167. Id.
168. See generallyAMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN EDUCATIONAL
FOUNDATION,

supranote 2.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/4

20

Hutchinson: Hutchinson: What You Know About and Don't Deal with Can Cost You:

2000]

STUDENT-ON-STUDENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT

513

protect children from harm and ensure that students receive an equal education.
Furthermore, schools need to teach student harassers that sexual harassment is
wrong so that student harassers do not become adults who pose problems leading
to liability for their employers under Title VII. The Davis Court correctly ruled
that school districts may be held liable under Title IX, but it imposed an overly
stringent standard in requiring actual knowledge of the harassment before a
school district can be held liable.
MONICA D. HUTCHINSON
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